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Abstract
White certificates schemes mandate competing energy companies to promote energy efficiency with flexibility
mechanisms, including the trading of energy savings. So far, stylized facts are lacking and outcomes are mainly
country‐specific. By comparing results of British, Italian and French experiences, we attempt to identify the
core determinants of their performances.
We show that (i) white certificates schemes are depicted in theoretical works as mandatory subsidies on
energy efficiency goods recovered by an end‐use energy tax, whereby white certificates exchanges are not a
central feature; (ii) at current stages, existing schemes are cost‐effective and economically efficient, with large
discrepancies though; (iii) the hybrid subsidy‐tax mechanism seems valid but conditional to cost pass through
permissions; otherwise, obliged energy companies merely promote information on the “downstream” side (i.e.
at the consumer level); (iv) although white certificates exchange between different types of actors involved can
be important as in Italy, trade among obliged companies is negligible; instead, flexibility sustains vertical
relationships between obliged parties and “upstream” partners (i.e. installers, energy service companies).
In this respect, we support the view that white certificates schemes are a policy instrument of multi‐functional
nature (subsidisation, information, technology diffusion), whose static and dynamic efficiency depends upon
the consistency between a proper definition of long‐term energy savings, the appropriate cost‐recovery
permission and a fine coordination with other instruments. We finally propose a four stages deployment
pattern, along which fragmented markets for energy efficient technologies get closer to create a unified market
delivering energy efficiency as a homogeneous good.
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1. Introduction
Energy savings obligations and credits, better known as “white certificates schemes”1, are a new
instrument enhancing the portfolio of policies for energy efficiency and conservation2, next to taxes,
subsidies and regulations. Their recent deployment in Europe (in Great‐Britain since 2002, in Italy
since 2005 and in France since 2006) is fostered by a renewed interest for energy conservation,
generally justified by its ability to correct for two market imperfections. First, reducing energy
consumption has positive externalities like cutting CO2 emissions and improving national energy
security. Second and more specifically, energy efficiency policies help overcome “barriers to energy
efficiency”, a notion gathering market barriers, market failures and behavioral failures responsible
for the observed underinvestment in energy efficient technologies, despite their social optimality
and private profitability under perfect information conditions (Gillingham et al., 2009; Sorrell et al.,
2004).
The specific rationale3 of white certificates schemes has to be found in demand‐side management
(DSM) programs implemented in the United Stated in the mid of the 1980s (Waide and Bucher, 2008;
Eyre et al., 2009). As part of integrated resource planning aimed at optimizing the electric supply and
demand systems, DSM programs obliged utilities to promote measures like information, direct
funding or any other kind of measures lowering energy consumption on the demand side, besides
measures targeting peak load reduction (Gillingham et al., 2006). White certificates schemes share
with DSM programs the underlying motivation that energy utilities have holds over final
consumption through commercial relationships, and hence are the best suited agent to tap the
scattered potentials for energy conservation, particularly present in the residential sector. Yet an
obligation imposed to public monopolies has to be adapted to the European context of liberalized
electricity markets, where a disincentive arises from selling energy on the one hand while promoting
energy efficiency on the other hand. Flexibility options are thus associated to energy savings
obligation in order to help energy companies meet their quantitative targets at the lowest cost, as
well as to support the evolution of traditional energy business models towards a broader energy
service business model (Eyre et al., 2009; Langniss and Praetorius, 2006). Among flexibility options,
the possibility to trade certified energy savings ties in white certificates schemes with the family of
market‐based instruments, which receive much emphasis in the field of environmental policy
(Labanca and Peerels, 2008).

1

“Energy savings certificates”, “Energy efficiency credits” or “White tags” can also be found in the literature.
We generally use the most common “white certificates scheme” terminology but “energy saving obligations
and credits” would be the most appropriate term.
2

Theoretically, white certificates schemes aim at energy conservation, i.e. both energy efficiency
improvements and changes in energy consumption patterns (Gillingham et al., 2009). In practice, most of the
white certificates measures target energy efficiency and we use indifferently the terms “efficiency” and
“conservation” in this paper.
3

In addition to the common objectives presented herein, national schemes can have particular focus. Notably,
the British scheme is designed to address fuel poverty. Nevertheless, to keep consistency in the comparison,
we will not detail outcomes related to country‐specific objectives.
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Albeit growing as schemes scale up, the literature on white certificates has felt short to capture the
whole complexity of the instrument to date. White certificates schemes guarantee energy savings
quantities and promote performance rather than means. As such, they do not target a single
technology but rather a still to be created “market for energy efficiency”, involving different
technologies, skills, and potentially a widespread constellation of actors, e.g. product manufacturers,
retailers and installers and energy services companies. Moreover, the flexibility provided potentially
implies as many possible compliance strategies as there are obliged parties. The interpretation of
white certificates schemes is thus challenging and a substantial amount of theoretical works, have
attempted to exhibit a straightforward representation of them by adopting different views, namely
mainstream microeconomics, transaction cost approaches and bottom‐up modelling. Moreover,
from an empirical point of view, due to its youth in existence, national evaluations (Bodineau and
Bodiguel, 2009; Lees, 2005, 2008; Pavan, 2008) and comparative ones (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2008;
Eyre et al., 2009; Mundaca and Neij, 2009) are available but generally conclude that schemes
performances are context‐specific and generalisations thus inappropriate. Lastly, insights from both
theoretical and empirical works are basically static, that is to say holding for given stages of the
scheme, whereas the architecture is evolutionary and permanently adapting to a new context.
Dynamic processes are at stake as long as successive technological potentials are tapped, each
transition requiring technology learning and market transformation.
Our goal is to extricate the core nature of white certificates schemes from the complexity of their
practical implementation and assess their performances under a unified framework. More precisely,
we seek answers to the following questions: In spite of different contexts and designs, can we draw
common insights from European experiences with white certificates schemes? Are they consistent
with the available stylized facts? How to represent the dynamic performance of white certificates
schemes? For that purpose, we compare as systematically as possible the achieved results of
European experiences with white certificates schemes in Great Britain, Italy and France4. We update
the comparative analysis quoted above and supplement them occasionally with insights from past
and present energy efficiency policy in the United States, where DSM programs have been expanded
in the form of energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) (Vine and Hamrin, 2008; Loper et al.,
2010). We stand from both private and collective point of view and base our comparative analysis on
the following assessment criteria5, inter‐dependent but not necessarily convergent:
•

Static efficiency – Analysed primarily through cost‐effectiveness, a twofold assessment
whereby the amount of induced energy savings are quantified and subsequently put in
regard to the measures cost. This is the most common criterion for comparing outcomes of
energy efficiency policies (Gillingham et al., 2006; Goulder and Parry, 2008). It is
complemented by a social efficiency assessment by factoring social benefits accruing from
reduced fuel bill and CO2 emissions. This analysis is of partial equilibrium nature, since we
make no case for macroeconomic retroactions on the cost‐benefit balance.

4

Similar schemes exist in the Flemish region of Belgium, in the New South Wales state of Australia and in
Denmark (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2008). We do not handle these schemes herein.
5

For the justification of using multiple evaluation criteria and their selection, see Mundaca and Neij (2009).
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•

Dynamic efficiency – The previous criteria assume the equilibrium to be the actual location of
the economy, whereas it can be seen as where the economy is tending in an evolutionary
perspective (Nelson and Winter, 2002). This allows for analyzing the dynamic process of
technological change along the successive phases of invention, innovation and diffusion
(Milliman and Prince, 1989; Stoneman and Diederen, 1994). Many authors have
acknowledged that the relevant failures in the field of energy efficiency are related to the
diffusion phase, i.e. the gradual adoption of technologies that are already mature (Sanstad
and Howarth, 1994; Newell et al., 1999). Therefore, we use the criterion of dynamic
efficiency to assess how flexibility provisions under white certificates schemes influence
industrial organisations, learning processes and investments in efficient technologies in the
long term (Finon and Menanteau, 2005).

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines basic concepts and reviews theoretical results on
white certificates schemes to identify a stylized representation. Section 3 compares the effectiveness
of the existing schemes and exhibits national drivers. Section 4 focuses on cost estimation to
complete the static efficiency analysis and assess the relevance of the stylized representation.
Section 5 departs from this static statement to assess organisational dynamics, closely related to the
way obliged parties cope with flexibility options. As a result of the previous static and dynamic
analysis, Section 6 proposes a prospective framework for the functioning of white certificates
schemes. Section 7 concludes.

2. White Certificates: concepts and practical design
In this section we sum up findings from the literature6 on white certificates schemes, dealing
especially with cost‐effectiveness and social efficiency.

2.1 Definition
Bertoldi and Rezessy (2008) provide an extensive definition of white certificates schemes. We
consider that the three following principles, common to all existing schemes, are sufficient to broadly
define a white certificates scheme in the context of liberalized energy markets:
(i)

Obligation – White certificates schemes are basically an obligation placed on energy market
operators (energy suppliers in the general case, but possibly energy distributors) to promote
energy conservation. Individual targets, generally labelled in units of energy to be saved, are
set and apportioned among obliged parties according to their market share in the household
energy retail market7. Obliged parties must comply with their individual target under a given
period of time. This constraint is binding, provided that any shortfall in compliance is

6

We examine primarily per‐reviewed articles. Most of them draw upon results from international research
projects, notably EuroWhiteCert and the IEA DSM task XIV (See <http://www.ewc.polimi.it> and
<http://www.ieadsm.org/ViewTask.aspx?ID=17&Task=14>, websites visited April 2010). For the detail of
research projects on white certificates schemes, see Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2008, p.329.
7

This is the general case so far. Note that Giraudet and Quirion (2008) test different apportionment rules.
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financially penalized8. In the context of liberalized and competitive energy markets, the
promotion of energy conservation might come at a cost (additional to the opportunity cost of
energy sales losses) and nothing theoretically precludes passing through this cost on the
energy tariff.
(ii)

Flexibility options – Obliged parties have different means to meet their obligation. They can
either produce energy savings by themselves or contract with third parties (equipment
manufacturer, retailer or installer, energy service companies). Ultimately, if they fall short of
their target, they can buy certified amounts of energy savings on a market supplied by
companies exceeding their target, or some non‐obliged parties if allowed.

(iii)

Deemed savings – To keep measurement and verification costs low on the one hand and
assign property rights for trading on the other hand, some standardized measures are
defined9. The associated amounts of energy savings are calculated ex ante under
conventional assumptions about unitary gains compared to a technological baseline, product
lifetime, etc. In this respect, the so‐called “white certificate” is both the energy savings
measurement unit (labelled in kWh, ton oil equivalent or avoided CO2 emissions) and the
commodity traded. More detailed calculations remain allowed for specific measures, but
deemed measures are designed to cover the targeted potential and to be used intensively.

This reduced set of features provides consistency in the functioning of white certificates, and the
higher the deviations from them, the higher the probability of regulatory pitfalls. With respect to this
characterization, white certificates belong to the family of quantity and performance‐based
instruments in the field of environmental policy, providing certainty of outcomes when
complemented by a penalty. Close to air pollution allowances (SO2 and NOX), carbon emission
allowances and “green” certificates for the promotion of renewable energy, white certificates can be
regarded as a baseline and credit scheme, with ex ante rather than ex post control. Although much
enthusiasm has been showed for the market component, it is not a central feature of the instrument.
Rather, the real novelty lies in both obliging energy suppliers to promote energy savings and
institutionalizing property rights on energy savings thanks to deemed calculation. Certificate trading
is only one flexibility option among others, which altogether concur to minimize the costs of
compliance.
Besides traditional justification of energy efficiency policies, white certificates are specifically aimed
at both tapping the scattered potential of residential energy consumption and supporting the
liberalization of energy markets. The definition provided above shows that these policy goals are
8

Note that the stringency of the penalty is not only a regulatory feature but also an economic signal. In
particular, a pre‐set penalty as implemented in France acts as a “buy‐out” price. The way the penalty is set in
other countries is detailed in Bertoldi and Rezessy (2008).
9

Consistently with footnote 2, most of the standardized measures are considered as “hard measures” and
target energy efficiency, i.e. investment in energy efficient technologies (efficient lighting, efficient heating
system, insulation measures...). A smaller set of “soft measures” targeting behaviour change also apply, e.g.
energy efficiency training for building workers in France. They are generally calculated with short lifetime
assumptions.
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consistently translated in regulatory terms. The apportionment by market share avoids distortion in
the competition between retailers on energy markets. As well, flexibility options allow overcoming
the disincentive of encouraging conservation while selling energy. To some extent, new commercial
advantages can even be drawn from energy efficiency differentiation (Vine et al., 2003). The use of
deemed savings provides information for tapping the scattered potential, hard to reach by definition.
White certificates can thus be seen as a coherent instrument. Lastly, they are supposed to avoid
public expenditures, which advocates for their implementation.

2.2 Theoretical properties
Three main approaches have been investigated to address white certificates to date:
microeconomics, bottom‐up modelling and transaction cost approaches. The former has been
prevailing and has carried out the most robust results.

Findings from microeconomic models
A set of works converge towards a stylized representation of white certificates schemes (Bye and
Bruvoll, 2008; Giraudet and Quirion, 2008; Oikonomou et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; Peerels, 2008; Sorrell
et al., 2008). Based on similar partial equilibrium models operating under perfect rationality, perfect
information and perfect competition assumptions, those papers generally depict the markets for two
goods: energy E and energy efficiency EE. The latter is an abstract representation of fragmented
markets for energy efficient goods and services (e.g. efficient light bulbs, condensing boilers,
insulation panels, training to efficient car driving, etc.)10. Three agents are involved: two
representative producers of E and EE and one representative consumer. From the consumer point
of view, the two goods are partial substitutes to provide an aggregate energy service, e.g. a certain
indoor temperature can be reached either by using an efficient boiler (high level of EE and low level
of E) or an inefficient one (low level of EE and high level of E). The consumer hence chooses the
right combination of E and EE to reach a given level of energy service while minimizing his
expenditures (or alternatively to minimise his energy service consumption subject to a budget
constraint) and producers maximise their profits (or alternatively minimize their costs) while
producing under decreasing returns.
Within this framework, white certificates schemes are an obligation placed on energy producers11 to
fund energy efficiency measures by granting subsidies to energy savings companies, ultimately
rebated to consumers. In turn, this burden is recovered through increased energy prices. As such,
white certificates schemes are treated as a hybrid instrument combining a mandatory subsidy with
an end‐use energy tax, as depicted on Figure 1. Note that the representative agent portray prevents

10

The energy efficiency good can be considered as the difference between a conventional and an efficient
equipment, whose cost is the differential between them. In Oikonomou et al. (2007), a conventional energy
consuming durable is explicitly in trade‐off with an efficient one. But this does not change significantly the
representation nor the results.
11

Energy producers are by default retail suppliers. One notable exception is Oikonomou et al. (2008) who
represent both energy distributors and retail suppliers and relationships among them. Moreover, most of the
works, except Giraudet and Quirion (2008), focus on electricity producers.
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from representing exchanges among multiple obliged companies. Some authors (Peerels, 2008;
Oikonomou et al., 2008) consider white certificate exchange in a simple way, with representative
agents selling or buying certificates as price takers.

Figure 1: White certificates mechanism: (a) tax in the energy market and (b) subsidy in the energy
efficiency market. In the case of a full cost recovery, triangles (abc) and (def) cover the same area.
Following this representation, all works conclude that white certificates schemes raise energy
efficiency investments and lower energy demand. Given upwards slopping supply curves, this
physical effect decreases ex‐tax energy price and increases ex‐subsidy energy efficiency price. But
final prices depend on rates applied to ex‐tax prices, which in turn depend on a bunch of factors, like
the energy market structure (Oikonomou et al., 2009) and the asymmetry between beneficiaries and
non‐beneficiaries of the scheme on the consumer side. Indeed, Sorrell et al. (2008) and Peerels
(2008) emphasize that only a few consumers benefit from the subsidy while all of them bear an even
energy price increase. As a result, the effect of white certificates on consumer prices is more
ambiguous than on quantities but generally increasing for energy and decreasing for the energy
efficient good. For example, Giraudet and Quirion (2008) show +1.8% and ‐4% respective price
evolution for a 2% decrease in energy consumption (for a model calibrated on the French economy,
under conventional behavioural assumptions). Overall, the results seem mainly affected by the
energy demand and supply price‐elasticites and the stringency of the instrument (Bye and Bruvoll,
2008). More specific insights can be drawn. Giraudet and Quirion (2008) feature an endogenous level
of energy service, allowing for comparing the rebound effects of white certificates to other policies
for energy efficiency. Within a cost‐effectiveness ranking dominated by energy taxes and whereby
subsidies to energy efficient goods stand at the bottom, white certificates entail a limited rebound
effect and are thus a good compromise between cost‐effectiveness and a moderate price evolution.
Closely related to this approach are engineering bottom‐up modelling works. They are generally
large‐scale numerical application of the partial equilibrium models to national economies like Italy
(Farinelli et al., 2005), the Netherlands (Oikonomou et al., 2007), Finland (Peerels, 2008) and even to
the EU‐25 (Mundaca, 2008). They do not draw additional stylized facts but rather provide case‐
specific outcomes, very dependent from numerical assumptions for parameters like discount rates
(Mundaca and Neij, 2009) as well as from parameters reflecting national economies.
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Findings from transaction cost approaches
The concept of transaction costs has been used early in the analysis of white certificates schemes.
The pioneer work of Langniss and Praetorius (2006) clearly referred to Transaction Cost Economics,
focusing on the explanation of specific arrangements between firms with respect to the type of
transactions. A substantial number of works refer to transaction costs with a different theoretical
purpose and we recorded three different definitions applied to specific fields of the literature:
•

One related to the microeconomics of cap and trade systems, as studied by Stavins (1995)
and Montero (1997). Transaction costs are simply defined herein as the costs of trading
(which is therefore a pre‐requisite) and unambiguously reduce cost‐effectiveness of market‐
based instruments. This is for example put forward in the field of white certificates by
Peerels (2008).

•

One related to the broader literature of energy services contracts (Sorrell, 2007; Sanstad and
Howarth, 1994).Transaction costs are defined as the cost of ex ante arrangement and ex post
control of a contract (more or less related to an investment). They are not necessarily
intricate with trading and might arise at any step of the scheme. Overall, this usage has the
same theoretical purpose as the previous one, i.e. to assess cost‐effectiveness losses along
the functioning of the scheme. Such a definition is applied to white certificates schemes by
Mundaca (2007), who describes and quantifies transaction costs originating from following
steps: planning, implementation, measurement and verification, trading, issuance and
redemption of white certificates.

•

One more specifically related to Transaction Cost Economics, as defined by New Institutional
Economics. Transaction costs are used here with markedly different theoretical purposes, in
that they help identify the appropriate governance structure to cope with a more or less
“specific” investment related to the “energy efficiency transaction”. In particular, the “make
or buy” decision results from the minimization of the sum of transaction costs plus
production costs. This is the way it is used by Langniss and Praetorius (2006) in the field of
white certificates.

Such piecemeal approaches seem confusing and the transaction cost analysis of white certificates
schemes is still unachieved. However, it can be helpful in two ways. First, they show how schemes
can generate additional costs that hamper their cost‐effectiveness performance. For example,
Mundaca (2007) shows that the cost‐effectiveness of the first period of the British scheme has been
effectively but slightly mitigated by costs related to information, consumer persuasion and
negotiation with third parties. Second, they highlight organisational arrangements under a flexible
scheme, involving many different agents. With this respect, they yield valuable results. For example,
Langniss and Praetorius (2006) foresee very little trade among obliged parties and rather long‐term
contracts.

To summarize their theoretical properties, white certificates schemes have been portrayed as a
hybrid instrument combining a subsidy for energy efficient goods with an end‐use energy tax
8
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allowing for cost recovery. This representation emphasizes transactions between obliged parties and
related energy efficiency business, rather than trade among obliged parties.

2.3 Practical implementation in varying national contexts
The previous attempt to provide a common analytical approach for white certificates schemes turns
obsolete as soon as one considers their practical implementation12. Because of the variety of agents
involved and the range of flexibility provisions, white certificates schemes happen to be more
sensitive to their regulatory environment than other instruments. Therefore, their implementation in
differing national contexts (in terms of electricity and gas industrial structure, energy policy portfolio
and regulatory traditions) led to different designs, and ultimately to different performances.
Differences among schemes have been extensively described by Bertoldi and Rezessy (2008), Eyre et
al. (2009), Mundaca et al. (2008), Oikonomou et al. (2007) and Vine and Hamrin (2008). We precise
in Table 1 some determinant features and comment them hereby.

Complementary policies in
the household sector
Source : Odysse, 2008

Obliged companies
Target in end-use energy

Great Britain
2005-08

Italy
2005-08

France
2006-09

Building codes

Building codes

Building codes

“Warmfront”, a government
scheme aimed at alleviating
fuel poverty

Tax deductions for energy
efficiency actions

Tax credits for energy
efficiency actions

6 electricity and gas
suppliers
64 TWh/year

30 electricity and gas
distributors
31 TWh/year

2560 energy suppliers
(all fuel except gasoline)

(128 TWh/year for 2008-11)

(100 TWh/year for 2005-12 with recent
target increase)

(100 TWh/year for 2009-12 with
projected target increase)

Households

All sectors,
22 standardized actions

All sectors except ETS
installations
170 standardized actions

Spot and over the counter
markets, participation of non
obliged actors allowed

Over the counter market,
participation of non obliged
actors allowed

18 TWh/year

(Own estimation detailed in annex)

Sectors covered

(50% to low income),
37 standardized actions
White certificates
exchange

Limited by administrative
requirements (preliminary
target achievement,
agreement of the regulator)

Table 1: Determinant features of existing schemes

Energy policy environments
White certificates schemes are inserted in policy‐rich environments whereby many interactions occur
(Child et al., 2008). First, all white certificates schemes interact on energy markets with other market‐
based instruments, like the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS) and
national incentives for renewable energy (feed‐in tariffs in France and “green” certificates in Great‐
Britain and in Italy). Those policies are justified by policy goals that are markedly different but
12

Depending on the period considered, the British scheme is referred to as EEC1 (Energy Efficiency
Commitment, 2002‐2005), EEC2 (Energy Efficiency Commitment, 2005‐2008) and CERT (Carbon Emissions
Reduction Target, 2008‐2011), the Italian scheme is referred to as TEE (Titoli di Eficienza Energetica, 2005‐
2012) and the French scheme is referred to as CEE (Certificats d’économies d’énergie, 2006‐2009).
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physically overlapping: lowering the carbon content of energy versus lowering the absolute energy
consumption. Nevertheless, the overlaps are limited by the different technological and sectoral
coverage of each instrument. Second, and more importantly, white certificates schemes coexist on
energy efficiency markets with policies designed with the same energy efficiency goal, namely energy
taxes, direct and fiscal subsidies, regulations, information disclosure and market transformation
programs (IEA, 2008). While much attention has been paid to the former interaction on theoretical
basis (Bye and Bruvoll, 2008; Farinelli et al., 2005; Oikonomou et al., 2008; Sorrell et al., 2008), little
has been devoted to the latter (Monjon, 2006). In the light of the framework provided by Bennear
and Stavins (2007), we will focus hereafter on those interactions, summarized in Table 1.
In a second‐best world encompassing market failures, a policy portfolio can outperform any stand‐
alone policy to address one single environmental problem, hence justifying the use of multiple
instruments. In the case of energy conservation, the under‐provision of energy efficiency
investments is one primary market failure calling for policy intervention. It is generally associated
with two market failures that can be regarded both as jointly ameliorating, in the sense that the
correction of one ameliorates welfare losses from the primary market failure (Bennear and Stavins,
2007; OECD, 2007). First of all, it is generally assumed that consumers face imperfect information
about energy efficiency investment options (Gillingham et al., 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004) and that
providing information can support energy efficiency instruments. This has been acknowledged in the
field of white certificates schemes by many authors (Farinelli et al., 2005; Oikonomou et al., 2007;
Peerels, 2008) and as a matter of fact, information campaigns and labels for efficient lighting and
appliances are present in every country.
Moreover, it is well‐known that technological change provides knowledge spillovers as positive
externalities, backing the joint use of environmental and technology policies (Fischer and Newell,
2007). This seems particularly relevant in the field of energy efficiency, where the diffusion of energy
efficient products is not optimal (Sanstad and Howarth, 1994; Newell et al., 1999), and we see in
Table 1 that white certificates schemes are complemented systematically by building regulations and
frequently by tax credits. Although stand‐alone policies are not evenly well suited to promote
technology diffusion ceteris paribus13, such combinations can be optimal if they are accompanied by
the appropriate policy coordination (Bennear and Stavins, 2007). Indeed, white certificates schemes14
seem to be adequately coordinated with building regulations, the latter providing the former with a
dynamic baseline (Sorrell et al., 2008). That is, deemed savings are calculated so as to be additional
to the evolutionary market standard set up by building codes for insulation and heating systems.
Furthermore, it seems that the joint use of white certificates schemes and fiscal subsidies as in Italy
and France can speed‐up the diffusion of efficient technologies with small market shares (Monjon,

13

In particular, Jaffe et al. (2004) consider that technology‐based standards may inhibit the diffusion of new
technologies, whereas market‐based instruments create incentives for increased diffusion of existing
technologies.
14

Note that we consider here white certificates schemes as a “genuine” instrument and abstract from our
previous statement that it is per se a hybrid instrument, whose own properties regarding technological change
have not been clearly established.
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2006). In that case, the adequate policy coordination is to condition policy combination to the initial
market share of the technology that is promoted.
These ex ante considerations require a careful ex post assessment, to evaluate to which extent the
interactions in place deliver their full benefits, as we will see later.

Energy market structures
At the end of the 1990s, the European Union has engaged major reforms to liberalize electricity and
gas markets15, which changed the motivations for energy efficiency policies compared to DSM
programs. On the one hand, the unbundling of vertically integrated utilities discourages the
promotion of energy efficiency along the whole value chain: transmission and distribution businesses
have no holds over end‐use consumers to implement programs, while generation and retail
businesses are not keen to reduce their sales as a consequence of energy efficiency programs. On the
other hand, the introduction of competition on retail services creates an incentive for suppliers to
provide energy service for commercial differentiation (Vine et al., 2003).

Great Britain

Italy

France

Market shares of the three largest
retail companies

Number of companies
with more than 5%
market shares

Nature of the market

Electricity

58%

6

Unbundled, full
competition

Gas

72%

6

Unbundled, full
competition

Electricity

91%

3

Unbundled, limited
competition

Gas

47%

2

Unbundled, limited
competition

Electricity

96%

1

Unbundled, limited
competition

Gas

100%

3

Unbundled, limited
competition

Table 2: Structure of the electricity and gas markets in 2007 (Source: European Commission, 2008)
The liberalization process has been achieved in Great‐Britain in 1998, in Italy in 2004 and in France in
2007. Although electricity and gas markets are similarly unbundled in those countries, the degree of
competition on retail markets shows large discrepancies (cf. Table 2), which has important
consequences for the functioning of white certificates schemes. The electricity and gas markets are
fully competitive in Great‐Britain and the market shares of the six obliged energy suppliers range
from 11% to 32% (Lees, 2008, p.21). Conversely in France, both electricity and gas markets are
concentrated and dominated by EDF and GDF SUEZ, respectively. One can expect from that situation
a higher propensity of energy suppliers to use energy efficiency as a marketing tool in Great‐Britain
15

According to the European Commission directives of 1996 regarding the internal electricity market (Directive
96/92/EC) and 1998 regarding the internal gas market (Directive 98/30/EC).
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compared to France, in response to the white certificates obligation. Note that in Italy, the obligation
is placed on energy distributors, which are actually natural regional monopolies. The rationale for
that regulatory choice is not straightforward, such agents not being the best suited ones to influence
end‐use energy consumption. It seems that it has been made to sustain the development of energy
service companies.

Size and scope of the schemes
As shown in the third row of Table 1, the schemes differ primarily in their size and sector coverage.
The long‐standing British scheme has now the highest target. As can be seen in the fourth row, they
also show different scopes. The British scheme encompasses a small number of obliged suppliers
(only six) and covers solely the household sector. Conversely, scopes are seemingly wider in Italy and
France, given the numerous obliged parties and broader coverage (extended to all end‐use sectors,
except the EU ETS installations in France). But the large number of obliged parties should not hide
that the number of major players is reduced in those concentrated energy markets. Moreover, as we
will see later, results focus on the residential sector, in spite of a wider coverage. Therefore,
differences in scope with the British scheme should be tempered.
Regarding the array of measures, national portfolios differ in terms of eligible technologies and
certificates issuance. There are 37 standardized actions in GB, 22 in Italy and 170 in France. Basic
technologies are identical and cover the most relevant potentials for energy efficiency (e.g. efficient
lighting, efficient appliances, efficient heating systems and insulation). It is worth mentioning some
country specific dispositions like “soft measures” for building professionals training in France or uplift
factors granted for innovative equipments and energy services in Great Britain. But the main
difference between national portfolios lies rather in the certificates issuance, in particular in the
assumptions made for energy savings calculation on conventional unitary consumption, conventional
lifetimes and discount rates. Savings are formulated similarly in France and Great‐Britain in kWh of
end‐used energy saved16, cumulated over average lifetimes of 20‐30 years and discounted at close
rates of 3.5 and 4%, respectively. Differently in Italy, savings are calculated in ton oil equivalent of
primary energy, with fixed lifetime of five years (eight years for insulation measures). We will see
that lifetime assumptions have a strong influence on the incentives to implement each measure.
All in all, the combination of a high target and a narrow scope in Great‐Britain makes this scheme –
older in existence – more ambitious than the others. Nevertheless, the wider scope of the Italian and
French scheme provides more flexibility, supposed to lower the cost of energy savings. It is thus
expected that the British scheme provides a high level of effectiveness and that Italian and French
schemes provide a high level of cost‐effectiveness. This is subject to the proviso acknowledged by
some authors that a wide coverage is also likely to bear additional costs from administrative tasks
that might hamper cost‐effectiveness (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2008; Langniss and Praetorius, 2006;
Mundaca et al., 2008).

16

This was the case under EEC1 and EEC2. Under CERT, savings are calculated in tons of CO2 saved and not
discounted, since CO2 is assumed to be removed definitively from the atmosphere once saved. Nevertheless,
the calculation method is the same.
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Flexibility provisions within schemes
In terms of flexibility17, two architectures seem to be opposed from the second and fifth rows of
Table 1. On the one hand, the “GB‐like” architecture fosters obliged parties self‐driven measures: the
obligation is borne by energy suppliers, whose relationship with final consumers is close and favours
direct actions, and white certificates exchanges are legally allowed but hurdled in practice by
administrative constraints, like the preliminary agreement of the regulator to engage in any
transaction. On the other hand, the “Italy‐like” architecture emphasizes white certificates exchange
as a central element: the obligation is borne by distributors operating on local and regional networks,
who have no commercial interest to support consumers that are not their customers, and exchanges
are eased by organised markets (spot and over the counter). Some non‐obliged parties are allowed
to promote energy savings by themselves and sell them to obliged parties, creating thus an
additional supply of white certificates. In‐between lies the French scheme: as in Great‐Britain, the
obligation is borne by energy suppliers, but the flexibility provisions are broad as in Italy (however to
a smaller extent, since there is no administered spot market). Given these overall incentive
structures, one might expect a different market activity in each country.
Next to flexibility provisions, the way the obligation burden can be recovered depends upon the
ability of obliged parties to pass through their costs on energy retail prices. Where the obligation is
borne by energy suppliers, as in Great‐Britain and France, the market is supposed to be liberalized
and such process allowed. While this holds for Great‐Britain, the persistence of regulated retail tariffs
disconnected from wholesale market prices in France renders this process up to the regulator, who
decided not to allow it so far. In Italy, energy distributors are regulated monopolies and the price of
the distribution service includes the expenditures generated by the obligation, as a standard
contribution of 100€ per ton oil equivalent (toe) saved (Pavan, 2008).

To sum up implementation outcomes, we have highlighted how national contexts condition national
designs. Each scheme can be characterized as the most ambitious in Great‐Britain, the most market‐
oriented in Italy, and the most flexible in France. We will analyse hereby the effective functioning of
national schemes to figure out how their respective designs condition their performances.

3. Effectiveness of the savings
As a performance‐based instrument, the effectiveness of white certificates schemes is assumed to be
measured against the mere target compliance. Albeit a matter of concern by itself (Mundaca and
Neij, 2009), we will not discuss here the intrinsic ambition of the target but readily examine its
17

A number of features of white certificates schemes are considered as “flexibilities” by some authors (Bertoldi
and Rezessy, 2008; Langniss and Praetorius, 2006). According to Mundaca et al. (2008), such flexibilities cover:
the range of eligible measures; the number of eligible end‐use sectors; the banking provision for surplus of
white certificates; the market engagement of non‐obliged parties; the trading option to equalise marginal
compliance costs. Unlike those authors, we do not consider design features as “flexibilities” per se, but rather
as drivers of the overall flexibility. We keep the very open definition of flexibility as the different means
provided to comply with individual targets, and seek how this notion is bounded and influenced by design
features.
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fulfilment, at both the aggregate level of national objectives (as labelled in the third row of Table 1)
and the disaggregate level of the underlying measures or technologies. Neither do we discuss the
accuracy of deemed measures calculation nor the potential realisation defects18. To keep consistency
in comparison among countries, we focus on energy effectiveness, measured in the same units of
energy savings (although savings are now reported in CO2 emissions savings in the ongoing CERT
scheme in Great‐Britain).
Note that a comprehensive assessment of effectiveness should take account for effects potentially
undermining schemes performances. First, free‐riding might occur, due in particular to potential
overlaps with pre‐existing energy efficiency policies. Second, some rebound effects are likely to
follow deemed measures implementation, however to a moderate magnitude (Giraudet and Quirion,
2008). These points will not be addressed here but in section 4.

3.1 Compliance with the target
A meaningful evidence of target fulfilment is the overachievements that occurred in every country19.
In Great‐Britain, the three‐year objectives of EEC1 and ECC2 where overachieved by 30% and 44%,
respectively (Lees, 2005, 2008). In France, the first three‐year period was overachieved by 20% (65
TWh against 54TWh required, according to DGEC, 2009). In all cases, the overachieved energy
savings were carried over to the next compliance period. In Italy, where objectives are supposed to
be fulfilled annually (but fully assessed in 2012), the first two years led to an overachievement of
more than 90% (Pavan, 2008). Yet overachievements have been decreasing as annual targets have
been scaled up. The potential for low cost measures is being exhausted, so that obliged distributors
are likely to fall short of their targets in the next periods.
Whereas overachievements raise effectiveness, the accounting for “early actions” against target
compliance might undermine it. It is noteworthy that in Italy, energy savings promoted between the
launch of the scheme in 2002 and its effective implementation in 2005 can be used to meet the
annual targets, and have actually represented 27% of the savings generated during the first two
years (Pavan, 2008). In Great‐Britain, savings generated under the predecessor Energy Efficiency
Standard of Performance (EESoP) program20 were also eligible (with a 10% of the target boundary
though) and represented less than 5% of EEC1 target (Lees, 2005). Contentious savings from early
actions are thus quantitatively limited and those schemes yielded net overachievements. Lastly, the
absence of penalty enforcement could be another piece of evidence for target fulfilment.

18

As pointed out by Lees (2008), Defra showed that insulation measures did not achieve their full saving
potential during EEC2, due for example to incomplete cavity wall fulfilment.
19

As stated by Mundaca et al. (2008), overachievements against the national objective do not necessarily imply
a fulfilment of all individual targets. Indeed, two obliged parties went out of business during the EEC1 scheme
and thus felt short of their target. But according to the authors, the overall performance can be interpreted as
effective.
20

The EESoP was an obligation placed on energy suppliers to invest in energy efficiency. It was implemented in
1993 and replaced in 2002 by the white certificates schemes, mandating performance rather than means.
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With this respect, the mere compliance with national objectives led to savings representing 0.6%,
0.3% and 0.14% of the sectors under coverage in Great Britain, Italy and France respectively,
according to the convergent estimates of Eyre et al. (2009) and Mundaca and Neij (2009).

3.2 Nature of the savings
A full assessment of the effectiveness of the schemes requires a close look at the technological
nature of the savings. To keep consistency in the comparison, we will focus on measures undertaken
in the residential sector, which encompasses the bulk of white certificates energy savings even in
countries with a broader coverage (86% in Italy, according to AEEG, 2008; 87% in France, according
to DGEC, 2009). Industrial measures generally cover small shares of white certificates energy savings,
due to a long‐standing rational use of energy in this sector.

National measures mix
National breakdowns depicted in Figure 1a show large discrepancies among countries: insulation
dominates in Great Britain, compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs) dominate in Italy and heating
device replacement dominates in France. Such a contrasted picture is striking, since flexibility is
supposed to first steer obliged parties towards lowest cost measures and then to operate alongside
an upward slopping marginal cost curve. Evidence for convex curves where unitary saving costs
increase with increasing energy savings have been recently exhibited from DSM programs (Arimura
et al., 2009, Figure 5). For illustration purpose, we use a very stylized step curve (Figure 1b) along
which the ranking of energy savings potentials is derived from McKinsey’s curve21
(McKinsey&Company, 2009). Following this representation, one would expect to see quite similar
patterns for all countries. The opposite observation raises two questions: (i) Can we build a single
cost curve for all three countries? (ii) Is it a relevant picture of the white certificates operating mode?

Figure 2: (a) National measures mix (source: AEEG 2009, DGEC 2009, Lees 2008); (b) Stylized
marginal cost curve

21

Unlike this study, we do not consider net present values but solely investment costs. The potentials are thus
ranked with positive costs, but the merit order is unchanged.
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The answer to the first question is very likely to be negative. Although numerous technologies are
similar from one country to another, the associated potentials for energy savings might differ. For
example, the market share of condensing boilers in 2004 was approximately 2% in France and 8% in
Great‐Britain (IEA, 2008, Figure 40). The market has taken off rapidly in Great‐Britain and average
condensing boiler prices are now 2,200€ in Great‐Britain (Lees, 2008, with 1.4€/£) and 8,600€ in
France (OPEN, 2009). Moreover, discrepancies between countries might arise for potentials that are
intrinsically different in technological terms. A relevant example is the difference between cavity wall
insulation (CWI) and solid wall insulation (SWI) measures. The former consists in injecting insulating
material in a cavity between indoor and outdoor brick walls and the latter in hanging panels on
indoor walls. CWI incurs lower technological costs than SWI because of lower costs of gross material
and the possibility to deploy neighbourhood‐scale actions (and therefore generate economies of
scale). Moreover, there might be substantially higher labour costs in the SWI case. Lastly, hidden
costs due to a higher annoyance of indoor works must be added to the cost of SWI. As a result, the
average cost per dwelling is 500€ for CWI and 6,000€ for SWI (Lees, 2008, with 1.4 €/£). Unlike
depicted on Figure 2, CWI is likely to stand at the beginning of the energy savings curve and SWI at a
higher marginal cost step. In France, there is no potential for CWI, which makes the overall potential
for insulation costlier than in Great‐Britain.
Regarding the second question, the French scheme shows a straight mismatch between the unitary
cost of measures and their respective share in the compliance mix (cf. Table 2). Interviewed energy
suppliers confirm that proceeding by increasing marginal cost measures is none of their strategy,
because they do not owe such information. While focusing on their core business with traditional
partners (e.g. installers of heating devices), they experiment at the same time a wide range of
measures to identify profitable potentials and then reveal an implicit curve. In addition, obliged
parties may keep the exploitation of inexpensive potentials for later use, by strategically anticipating
further difficulties under what can be considered as a three‐year repeated game. This effect is limited
however by the use of dynamic baselines that remove low cost potentials as far as they become the
market standard.

Countryspecific determinants
Therefore, a stylized theoretical cost curve turns irrelevant to interpret current measures mix, rather
driven by national determinants. In Great Britain, energy suppliers concentrate on insulation, whose
share in terms of kWh saved has increased from 56% in EEC1 to 75% in EEC2 (Lees, 2008). As just
stated, they benefit from the attractive potential of CWI. It is worth reminding that the
implementation of the EESoP program in 1993 allowed obliged parties to explore different potentials
and early identify the most cost‐effective, a process still at stake in other countries. The potential for
CWI is far from being exhausted according to observers and energy suppliers would further
concentrate on this measure in the future (Eyre et al., 2009). Next to insulation, other potentials
have been tapped actively. Under EEC1, the markets for “white goods” like A‐rated wet and cold
appliances have been dramatically transformed. Likewise, the market for condensing boilers has
reached full maturity under EEC2 and some markets like integrated digital televisions and stand‐by
savers have been rapidly transformed owing to uplift factors (Lees, 2005, 2008).
In Italy, CFLs and hot water economizers dominated until recently in the residential sector (Pavan,
2008). The promotion of these “low hanging fruits” has been boosted by the eligibility of merely
16
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distributing reduction coupons, not even guaranteed by the effective purchase of those equipments.
What can be considered as a regulatory pitfall has been corrected in 2008. Furthermore, the 5 years
lifespan used to calculate deemed savings does not provide the adequate incentive for long‐term
savings measures. In the case of insulation, notably absent from the Italian scheme, the theoretical
lifetime has been set to eight years, which remains far below the values used in Great‐Britain and
France (40 and 35 years, respectively). Nevertheless, the current difficulties showed by obliged
distributors to reach their recently increased target (Pavan, 2008) after overachievement in the
previous years indicates that the least cost potentials are being exhausted. More costly and
organisational demanding measures become necessary and a growing number of information
campaigns and training programs are observed. In France, around two thirds of the savings have
targeted space‐heating systems (condensing boilers, heat pumps). Although insulation is the biggest
potential22, it represents less than 10% of the savings. We will see that the overlapping tax credit
scheme is the main driver of this breakdown.
Share of total
delivered savings

Tax credit rate,
if any

Unitary cost
(c€/kWh)

Individual condensing boiler

22.5%

25-40%

6.4

Individual low-temperature boiler

12.8%

15%

10.9

Collective condensing boiler

7.1%

25-40%

1.0

Air-to-air heat pump

6.9%

50%

10.9

Roof and attic insulation

5.8%

25-40%

1.9

Efficient glazing

4.6%

25%

18.2

Air-to-water heat pump

4.0%

50%

10.0

Collective low-temperature boiler

2.7%

15%

1.6

Independant wood furnace

2.6%

50%

7.0

Wall insulation

2.3%

25-40%

4.8

Table 3: Representative measures in the French residential sector (Source: DGEC, 2009)

To conclude with the nature of the savings, national contexts and evaluation metrics prevail over
technological considerations, as stated by Eyre et al. (2009). Even though compliance is not
necessarily undertaken at the lowest cost according to narrow technological considerations,
dominant measures happen to be the most rewarding for obliged parties given the schemes
incentive structures and deemed calculations. Every country stands at the very beginning of energy
savings potentials, given that obliged parties and their subcontractors promote the diffusion of
technologies already mature and commercially available rather than innovation (Mundaca and Neij,
2009). At subsequent stages, one can expect a convergence of the dominant measures in each
country towards thermal measures (insulation, air conditioning) and even more costly whole house
retrofit packages.

22

ADEME estimates the theoretical saving potential in the household sector to be 6,750 TWh (lifetime
cumulated and 4% discounted), in which insulation measures account for 60%.
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3.3 Policy interaction and additionnality of the savings
As stated in Section 2.3, some policy combination can be justified on ex ante considerations about
the existence of multiple market failures. But whether policies are sub‐additive or over‐additive in
terms of energy savings effectiveness within the portfolio requires a careful ex post assessment. We
saw that white certificates schemes are accurately defined so as to provide energy savings that are
additional to building regulations, which makes this interaction fully effective. Another notable policy
overlap occurred in Great Britain between the ECC1 scheme and the “Warm Front” program
(Mundaca et al., 2008). Indeed, small amounts of energy savings from this public fund targeted to
alleviate fuel poverty have been purchased by some obliged parties to meet their obligation, which
did not change crucially the effectiveness of the scheme.
The outcomes are more ambiguous regarding the interaction with fiscal subsidies for energy efficient
technologies. In France, the ten most granted measures all benefited at the same time from tax
credits ranging from 15 to 50% (cf. Table 3). We estimate that the tax credit scheme has sustained
nearly all the measures supported by obliged suppliers in the household sector under the white
certificates scheme. In turn, 20% of the tax credit amounts (2.7 billion Euros in 2009 granted to 1.3
million people, according to MEEDDM, 2010) have granted white certificates. If the tax credit scheme
has clearly driven the white certificates scheme, some observers consider that it would not have had
such a success without being advertised by energy suppliers in their customer persuasion task, acting
indirectly as information tool (Bodineau and Bodiguel, 2009). The additionnality of this interaction
depends upon the initial penetration of the technologies jointly promoted (Monjon, 2006). Although
we lack of distance to fully assess market transformations, it seems that the policy overlap has
stimulated the penetration of heat pumps but has been ineffective to foster low‐temperature boilers
that had already significant market shares. Likewise, the tax credit scheme did not cover installation
costs, which prevail in the insulation cost share as opposed to heating devices, and the joint policies
have not supported appropriately insulation measures.

4. Costs and benefits of the schemes
4.1 The cost estimation challenge
Next to the assessment of effectiveness, a fully‐fledged cost‐effectiveness evaluation calls for a cost
estimation. Such information is also useful to handle organisational outcomes. Yet under white
certificates schemes, this task collides with data availability. Since performance matters rather than
means, obliged parties expenditures are not a matter of control. Moreover, on European liberalized
energy markets, cost is a sensitive piece of information that energy suppliers are reluctant to furnish.
Therefore, costs of white certificates schemes do not have to be reported, as opposed to public
utilities DSM programs in the United States, where extensive evaluation can be made (Laughran and
Kulick, 2004; Gillingham et al., 2006; Aufhammer et al., 2008; see Arimura et al., 2009, for recent
estimates and a review of previous ones).
Any cost assessment thus requires a specific evaluation. Although one would expect the exchange
price of white certificates to be helpful data for that task, it turns out to be inappropriate in most of
the cases. First, according to economic theory, it equals the marginal cost of compliance, whereas
the average cost would be the most appropriate estimate of the total cost of the scheme. Second, its
18
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significance as a marginal cost indicator depends upon the amount of white certificates traded,
which is high in Italy but very low in France and Great‐Britain. Lastly, the cost share of the underlying
energy saving measure attributable to the scheme is uneasy to separate from the one attributable to
overlapping energy efficiency instruments. Much empirical data is therefore needed on the cost of
realised measures and the type of agent bearing costs (obliged and eligible parties, consumers and
public budget). In this prospect, we compare hereafter the costs of the three schemes estimated by a
methodology designed by Lees (2005, 2008) for the British scheme.
In a social efficiency perspective, the evaluation of the costs incurred by all agents involved in the
scheme implies a basic distinction between costs directly related to investments in energy efficiency
on the one hand, and all other costs on the other hand. The “direct costs” represent volume‐related
rebates granted to consumers and borne by obliged parties, but also by actors specifically involved
like social housing providers in Great‐Britain and the Government in France (funding the tax credit
scheme). The residual part of investment costs is borne by energy saving measures beneficiaries, so
that the sum of direct costs equals investment costs23. Next to direct costs, “indirect costs” represent
the other costs borne by obliged parties while managing their obligation. They may or may not be
volume‐related. Since the costs of administering the scheme ought to be negligible compared to
companies costs from previous experiences24, we consider solely indirect costs incurred for tasks like
project development, marketing, reporting, etc.

4.2 Static efficiency assessment
Costeffectiveness assessment
The total costs of the British scheme are comparable to the costs of the French one, for a much
higher target. In terms of cost‐effectiveness, i.e. costs related to the same amount of energy savings,
the difference ratio is around four (0.91 against 3.69c€/kWh). The main explanation is probably that
thanks to a longer learning process, energy suppliers in Great‐Britain have been able to concentrate
on highly cost‐effective insulation programs25, whereas they have focused in France on historical but
costlier measures on heating systems (heat pump measures being particularly expensive).
Nevertheless, overall costs are lower than expected (e.g. 20% less than Defra’s expectations in Great‐
Britain) and in every country, the costs of conserved energy are at least four times lower than energy
retail prices. They are of the same order of magnitude as the last available evaluation of United
States DSM programs, whereby 1.1% of the residential electricity consumption has been saved at an
average cost to utilities of about 6 cents per kWh saved (Arimura et al., 2009).
23

More precisely, the full investment cost for measures like insulation but the cost differential with the
standard technology for boilers and appliances.
24

Lees (2008) estimates that costs incurred by the administrator (OFGEM) do not exceed 1% of total costs
while costs incurred by the regulator (Defra) are negligible.
25

It is noteworthy that the related cost decrease is apparently countervailed by the progressive shift towards
costlier potentials. Indeed, cost‐effectiveness estimates of the savings were 1.3p/kWh for electricity and
0.5p/kWh for gas during EEC1 and 2.1p/kWh for electricity and 0.6p/kWh for gas during EEC2 (Lees, 2005,
2008). Early evidence from the CERT scheme shows much higher cost‐effectiveness estimates.
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Great‐Britain
2005‐08

France
2006‐09

Italy
2005‐08

1 085

66

Obliged party indirect cost (M€)

195

119

Customer cost (M€)

325

814

‐

Other party cost (M€)

153

991

‐

1 758

1 990

‐

192

54

128

13 020

4 320

11 181

CO2 savings (MtCO2)

72.6

17.7

42.7

Central monetary value of CO2 savings (M€)

6 302

815

853

TOTAL BENEFITS (M€)

19 322

5 135

12 035

Net social benefits, excluding CO2 savings (M€)

11 262

2 330

‐

Net social benefits, including CO2 savings (M€)

17 564

3 145

‐

Cost‐efficiency, excluding CO2 savings (€ gained per € spent)

7.41

2.17

‐

Cost‐efficiency, including CO2 savings (€ gained per € spent)

10.99

2.58

‐

Cost‐effectiveness (c€ spent per kWh saved)

0.91

3.69

‐

Unitary cost for obliged parties (c€ spent per kWh saved)

0.67

0.34

0.84

Program costs
Obliged party direct cost (M€)

1 080

TOTAL COSTS (M€)

Program benefits
End‐use energy savings (TWh)
Monetary value of energy savings (M€)

Table 4: Static efficiency analysis (consolidated results, see annex for calculation details)

Social efficiency assessment
Benefits should be balanced against costs to assess the socio‐economic efficiency of the schemes.
Benefits come primarily from the monetary valuation of reduced energy operating expenditures and
avoided CO2 emissions ensuing energy savings from the consumer standpoint, although social
benefits accruing from the British scheme should be intangibly magnified by fuel poverty alleviation.
Private benefits might also accrue to obliged parties from energy price increase or market share
gains. We consider them as transfers between consumers and energy companies or among energy
companies, and thus do not count them. Table 4 shows that the French and British schemes (and
very likely the Italian scheme) have undoubtedly gathered net social benefits. They pay for
themselves, whether environmental benefits from carbon savings are taken into account or not.
Large discrepancies between cost‐efficiency estimates (excluding CO2 savings) arise, due to the much
higher target in Great‐Britain, related to comparable costs. These discrepancies are magnified by a
20
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very contrasted valuation of CO2 savings, according to industrial differences in electricity generation
in both countries (see Annex for details).

4.3 Cost distribution among involved agents
A closer look at the distribution of costs among agents is helpful for explicating obliged parties
strategies. Table 5 shows that the bulk of obliged parties costs are direct costs in Great‐Britain (85%)
as opposed to France, where the share of direct costs is generally much lower (36%) but contrasted
among obliged parties. In particular, direct cost shares are low for the two main obliged parties but
comparable to British shares for fuel oil retailers. Apart from that distinction, the last row of Table 6
exhibits a very low cost heterogeneity within countries, cost differences never exceeding 5% among
obliged parties, for a given measure. According to Lees (2008) and Mundaca (2007), half of the
indirect costs in Great‐Britain are volume‐related, mainly for tasks like marketing, providing
information to consumers and negotiating with third parties. In France, the development of energy
efficiency allegations in commercial offers has borne sizeable indirect costs, by 77% variable. For
instance, EDF has launched a new brand “Bleu Ciel” on the mass market, enriching the former brand
“Vivrelec” with information and advice services. Without changing the mark, GDF SUEZ has
developed a quite similar strategy while including a financial support for energy efficiency measures
in its brand “Dolce Vita”26.
Great-Britain
2005-08

France
2006-09

Share of total costs incurred by obliged parties

73%

9%

Share of direct costs within obliged parties cost

85%

36%

Total cost variation among obliged parties

5%

4%

Table 5: Cost distribution among involved agents (Source: Lees (2008) and Mundaca and Neij
(2009) for Great‐Britain; own estimation for France)
This breakdown can be interpreted as follows. In all segments in Great‐Britain and on the fuel oil
segment in France, high direct costs correspond to large subsidies granted by obliged parties to
consumers for investments in energy efficient equipments. Conversely, on the other French energy
markets, obliged parties develop services less appealing from the consumer perspective, like
information, energy diagnosis, etc (Bodineau and Bodiguel, 2009). Unlike the early assertion of
Bertoldi and Rezessy (2008), the reference modus operandi of subsidies granted by obliged parties is
therefore not systematic. As a result, albeit four times less cost‐effective for the society, the French
scheme is approximately twice less expensive for obliged parties than the British one (see Table 5,
last row). In particular, the current obliged parties cost is far below the penalty and the 1c€/kWh
reference cost generally used in ex ante evaluations.
When extending the analysis to all agents involved, it turns out that the total costs of the scheme are
mostly covered by obliged parties in Great‐Britain, whereas consumers investing in energy efficiency
are large contributors in France. In addition, the tax credit scheme is actively used by obliged agents
26

See <www.edf‐bleuciel.fr> and <www.dolcevita.gazdefrance.fr> (website visited April 2010)
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to persuade customers, which makes the public budget the most significant funder of energy
efficiency measures realised by white certificates schemes. With the assumption of a variable public
deficit, this outcome is not consistent with the rationale of the scheme to avoid public costs.
Moreover, even though performance matters rather than means, this raises property rights
concerns, since certificates are owed by parties that sometimes barely funded them (Bertoldi and
Rezessy, 2008).

4.4 Cost recovery practices and “downstream” strategies
“Downstream” strategies, i.e. obliged parties strategies towards final consumers, appear to be
determined by cost recovery practices, deeply influenced by liberties given to obliged parties in
energy price setting. This can be established from the comparison of three different regulatory
situations, differing by whether the obligation is placed on energy suppliers subject to unregulated
energy prices (as in Great‐Britain and partly in France), on energy suppliers subject to regulated
prices (as in dominant cases in France) or on energy distributors, whose business (and output price)
is regulated (as in Italy).
In Great Britain, where energy prices are set freely in liberalized and effectively competitive energy
markets, subsidies for energy efficiency measures are a basic strategy for energy suppliers. We are
not able to decompose their margin, so there is no way to ascertain whether energy suppliers fully
pass through the compliance cost27 on energy prices. Nevertheless, it is assumed as such by the
British Government and Lees (2008) estimates that the expenditures by the energy suppliers
represent on the average 6.9£ (or 9.7€) per customer per year, equivalent to 1‐2% of the average
annual fuel bill. This conforms well to the hybrid subsidy‐tax mechanism depicted in microeconomic
models and as outlined in Section 2.3, the high level of competition on energy markets exacerbates
the incentive provided to energy suppliers to have aggressive “downstream” strategies. The
correlation between subsidisation and flexibility in energy price setting seems all the more robust
that it holds also for the fuel oil segment in France, where prices are not regulated and obliged
suppliers vastly use rebates. One could expect that the pre‐existing incentive of the tax credit scheme
would reduce rebate levels, but fuel oil retailers need to keep incentives high to countervail the
marked decline of their business with growing environmental concerns28.
In France, the target was set to generate limited energy price increase of +0.5%. On the dominant
electricity and natural gas mass market segments in France, the persistence of regulated tariffs
dramatically restricts cost recovery permissions and obliged suppliers are not keen to provide
financial incentives to consumers. Instead, they tend to offer relatively inexpensive services like
information and diagnosis which bear indirect rather than direct costs. They concentrate on lowering
costs, in particular indirect costs by working on structuring the upstream business. This is a way to
27

The compliance cost is supposed to equal the cost of the subsidy, if any, plus the opportunity cost of energy
sales losses.
28

Interestingly, although not obliged at the beginning of the consultation process, fuel oil retailers saw an
opportunity to make their business evolve and asked for participating to the scheme. As stated previously, their
participation was also an opportunity for the regulator to enhance the number of players and therefore
enhance trade provisions.
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safeguard paybacks by commercial advantages, rather than playing on the output price. Note that
the situation is slightly different on other markets like local communities, for which more specific
measures have to be promoted and where consumers are more aware of potential benefits from the
scheme29.
In Italy, a peculiar situation occurs, whereby obliged distributors are granted 100€ for every toe of
certified savings, paid ultimately by energy consumers through a flat tariff contribution (Pavan,
2008). While energy service companies are acting towards consumers, distributors provide few
incentives for energy efficiency measures and rather buy certificates at an average spot market
price30 of 60€/toe. This situation yields large private benefits for distributors at the expense of
consumers and moves away from the rationale of the instrument, supposed to avoid public
fundraising. That forced the regulator to intervene on white certificates markets by increasing the
number of obliged parties and unifying the electricity and gas ‘titoli’ to reduce the concentration of
market players. The market reacted in increasing the average exchange price, thus lowering the
benefits accruing to distributors and keeping the incentives for energy service companies to invest in
costlier measures high. Recently, the contribution tariff has been decreased.

To conclude this section, white certificates schemes conform to stylized facts if they are inserted in
the appropriate unregulated energy price context, as in Great‐Britain and on the fuel oil segment in
France. Where output tariffs are regulated, in Italy and on electricity and gas markets in France,
obliged actors must develop strategies more remote from the consumer level.

5. Flexibility provisions and “upstream” strategies
From Radov et al. (2006), we consider flexibility options as two basic forms of trade31:
•

Vertical trade – Outsourcing relationships between different parties facing uneven
transaction costs32, namely obliged energy companies and third parties, aimed at minimizing
transaction costs, thus lowering the cost of delivering energy efficiency measures.

29

It should be underlined that the scheme has been designed for these actors, leaning on the fact that they
would produce white certificates and sell them. Such investments being not ensured by the actual low
exchange price, they have showed a preference towards long‐term contracts to date.
30

As stated earlier, marginal costs of compliance should equal the spot market price. Nevertheless, it is likely
that spot exchanges are risky and thus bear additional costs. Taking the spot market price as a proxy for costs is
thus conservative and underestimates potential private benefits.
31

The authors consider the banking of energy savings as a third, “intertemporal” form of trade, essentially
aimed at reducing temporal risk. Albeit significant in all countries (see Section 3.1), we do not consider it as a
relevant element to tackle with organisational issues and therefore leave it aside from our analysis.
32

Broadly defined as costs other than production costs.
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•

Horizontal trade – White certificate exchange between similar parties facing heterogeneous
production costs, aimed at equalizing marginal costs, thus lowering the overall cost of the
scheme.

Such a distinction based on the type of parties engaged in transactions allows for disconnecting the
broad concept of trade from the narrow concept of white certificates exchange. While generally
perceived as horizontal trade, we argue that white certificates exchange might also be seen as
vertical trade if it involves two different types of parties. It is noteworthy that by linking target
compliance to transfers from energy producers to energy saving goods producers, microeconomic
models have stressed vertical rather than horizontal trade.
The “flexibility” component has been advertised by policy‐makers alongside the implementation
process to convince obliged suppliers of the potential benefits they could draw, thereby
overshadowing the elementary “obligation” component. In particular, the prospect of capturing new
rents thanks to market mechanisms has been appealing for obliged agents, up to the point that it
certainly drove the large scope of the Italian and French schemes. But the experience indicates that
white certificates exchange has not been a panacea to date. By comparing updated results of the
three European experiences, we seek answers to the following questions: to which extent does the
market for white certificates bring flexibility in the functioning of white certificates, as compared to
other options? Altogether, what is the influence of flexibility options on “upstream” organisation, i.e.
obliged parties strategies towards their related energy businesses?

5.1 Overall activity of the markets for white certificates
One straightforward outcome of white certificates schemes is the opposite market activity in France
and Great‐Britain, as compared to Italy. Whereas white certificates exchanges were negligible in
Great‐Britain and cover only 4% of certified energy savings in France (Bodineau and Bodiguel, 2009),
they represent 75% of white certificates issuance in Italy so far (Eyre et al., 2009). From the
contrasted designs exposed in section 2.3, we expected a high market activity in Italy, a low market
activity in Great‐Britain and ambiguous outcomes in France. The fact that French results match the
British ones suggests that from the two determinant design features, namely the type of obliged
agents (common to France and Great‐Britain) and the easiness of exchanges (common to France and
Italy), the former prevails for explaining the market activity. Italian specific outcomes can thus be
interpreted as follows. Energy distributors have no direct holds over final consumption nor
commercial advantages to draw from end‐use consumers because they are not their customers.
Moreover, the high level of normalized cost recovery provides an incentive to maximise the margin
and buy at low cost or to outsource energy efficiency measures. As a result, energy distributors are
not keen to promote actively energy conservation and prefer to purchase white certificates. White
certificates exchanges are mostly realised over the counter (78%) rather than on organised spot
markets, intrinsically riskier. While the demand for white certificates comes exclusively from obliged
parties, the supply might be a number of different actors and 72% of certificates were traded
between an obliged party and a third party (Pavan, 2008). In other words, small energy service
companies have been the main suppliers of white certificates. In most of the cases, those are
subsidiaries of obliged distributors within an integrated industrial group. The predominance of
bilateral exchanges between energy distributors and related energy service companies suggests that
24
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long‐term outsourcing contracts dominate (Eyre et al., 2009; Langniss and Praetorius, 2006). That is
to say, vertical trade dominates.
Whenever the type of obliged parties provides sufficient grounds for explaining the level of market
activity, other factors are at play to explain the absence of white certificates exchanges in France and
especially in Great‐Britain33. First and foremost, costs borne by obliged parties must be
heterogeneous to allow for horizontal trade. Applying the framework provided by Newell and Stavins
(2003) to white certificates schemes, cost heterogeneity might arise from (i) the heterogeneity in
individual targets and (ii) the heterogeneity in firms cost functions. Regarding the first criterion,
individual targets are distributed according to market shares in the household sector and it is clear
that they are very contrasted in Italy and France but rather homogeneous in Great‐Britain. Regarding
the second criterion, we showed that obliged suppliers face very similar costs in France and Great‐
Britain, regardless of their size (cf. Table 5). In the perspective of supporting the diffusion of goods
that they do not product, energy suppliers’ cost function depends directly on their access to other
energy efficiency businesses, and it seems that those actors propose very similar prices. Outcomes
regarding these two criteria are likely to be magnified by some sensitive policy parameters like the
scope of the obligation and especially the stringency of the overall target. Peerels (2008) provides
numerical simulations showing that market exchanges could become significant in Finland for a
coverage of at least 28% of the saving potential; below that threshold, measures are inexpensive and
trade is useless. In the real world, targets do not exceed 0.6% of the energy consumption under
coverage. Second, reluctance to trade can be invoked to explain the low market activity. As obliged
suppliers compete on energy retail markets, some commercial benefits might arise from non‐trading,
like market share preservation and cost increase for competitors. Through a game simulation
involving real energy suppliers, Mundaca et al. (2008) show that potential losses associated with
trading can exceed additional costs of non‐trading in Great‐Britain. As a result, obliged suppliers
show preference towards autarkic strategies34.
This issue can be narrowed to past and present experiences with market‐based instruments for
environmental policy in the United States. In the 1990s, the air pollution cap and trade programs
have witnessed very low market activity, due mainly to a preference towards autarky (Burtraw,
1996). More recently, in the four states where EERS have been implemented with market provisions,
namely Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Connecticut, only in the latter does the market
show a significant activity (Loper et al., 2010). This reminds us that under quantity instruments, the
market is just a way among others to comply with the elementary “command and control”
component.

33

In their extensive analysis of the market activity, Mundaca et al. (2008) review a large set of explanations,
including: commercial benefits of non‐trading; excess supply; limited number of parties and market power;
perceived high transaction costs; banking options.
34

Nevertheless, this does not prevent optimization behaviour at the margin. One major supplier in France
claims having purchased a small amount of white certificates to have a benchmark of marginal cost. Albeit
volatile, the average exchange price on the French market for white certificates (0.32 c€/kWh) equals obliged
parties cost estimates of 0.34 c€/kWh acknowledged in Section 4.3.
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5.2 Vertical trade and “upstream” transactions
Altogether, results from the three European experiences show that energy suppliers take advantage
of flexibility options mainly through vertical trade. We have seen that the high market activity
observed in Italy should not be interpreted as horizontal trade between obliged parties, but rather as
vertical exchanges between energy distributors and related energy service businesses. As well, there
is no horizontal trade in France and Great‐Britain, owing to the near absence of organized white
certificates markets between obliged parties. Instead, obliged suppliers tend to develop contracts
with upstream businesses under a win‐win relationship: obliged parties need installers to diffuse
information35 and ultimately undertake measures, while small installers benefit from the large
customer portfolio of energy suppliers. Let us consider the upstream relationships emerging in
different countries.
According to different authors (Eyre et al., 2009; Lees, 2008; Mundaca et al., 2008), British energy
suppliers develop close relationships with insulation contractors, managing agents, housing
promoters, retailers and manufacturers, and develop partnerships with social housing programs and
charity organisations. The market for insulation contractors is dominated by a few actors and 100%
of insulation measures have relied on subcontracting. This implies a very competitive bidding process
that equated compliance costs among obliged suppliers. As well, some energy suppliers deal directly
with manufacturers to promote innovative equipments like integrated digital televisions (Lees, 2008).
In Italy, the scheme was supposed to serve the development of energy service companies, which fill
the gap between distributors and final consumers36. As said above, many of them are subsidiaries of
obliged distributors and deal with them through “intra‐obliged party” trade. It must be emphasized
though that they are generally very small units, sometimes solely created to distribute reduction
coupons on CFLs to consumers. So far, the scheme has only partly succeeded in supporting the
development of formal energy service companies, independent from obliged parties. In France,
major energy suppliers acknowledged that all of their energy efficiency actions are co‐operated with
installers or formally subcontracted. While they have few rooms to recover the burden through
increased energy prices, they work with installers to develop attractive commercial offers, rather
than directly grant their customers with large rebates (as stated in Section 4.4). As opposed to Great‐
Britain, the market for insulation counts thousands of small actors, for which insulation is not a
specialisation but rather one skill among others dedicated to housing works. Obliged suppliers
strengthen networks around them to structure this market by training professionals37 , labelling them
and rewarding their energy efficiency actions towards consumers. This task is all the more innovative

35

Mahapatra and Gustavsson (2009) showed for example that installers of heating systems are the most
important communication channel for providing information to final energy consumers.
36

It is worth mentioning that there are exceptions to that outsourcing process. Actually, energy distributors
operate by themselves where they have operating licence with municipalities like on public lighting and district
heating system, which represented respectively 7% and 5% of the white certificates issued in 2005‐2007.
37

Up to now, 10,400 people out of 356,000 small companies have received training courses funded by 95% by
energy suppliers (CAPEB, 2009).
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and competitive that some companies try to investigate the same business segment as eligible
parties, without bearing the opportunity costs of energy sales losses (e.g. ‘Certinergy’ company38).

It comes out that the obligation to promote energy conservation in liberalized energy markets
prompts energy companies to turn their traditional business model into an energy service provider
business model, through integrated up‐ and downstream strategies. On the downstream side,
commercial offers are all the more changing in countries where the constraint cannot be recovered.
Competitors can differentiate by providing information and advice (Hinnels, 2008), as it is argued in
France by EDF commercial director (Poiroux, 2009). In Great‐Britain, commercial offers are more
stable and energy suppliers keep energy efficiency operations separate from their core business
(Eyre et al., 2009), while providing large rebates though. The former strategy bears lower but
essentially indirect costs, whereas the former bears higher direct costs that can be recovered by
energy tariffs. In parallel, powerful change occur similarly in every country on the upstream side
through vertical arrangements with energy efficiency businesses.

6. An evolutionary perspective of white certificates
functioning
In what precedes, we basically drew country‐specific conclusions, holding at the current steps of the
schemes. They reflect the complexity of the instrument and underline the effects of design details on
the performance and strategies of involved parties. The performance of white certificates schemes to
deliver long‐term and cost‐effective benefits requires consistency between three elements: (i) a
proper definition of deemed savings, favouring actions with long lifetimes and ensuring that the
white certificates issuance is clearly additional to the business as usual; (ii) an adequate cost recovery
permission, allowing for subsidizing end‐use customers, which is seemingly the most powerful way to
reach costly saving potentials; (iii) an appropriate policy coordination with overlapping instruments.
Taking this “consistency principle” for granted, we argue that by aiming energy performance without
mandating any specific technology, white certificates schemes have the ability to bring closer
fragmented and isolated markets for energy efficient technologies, leading ultimately to a fully‐
fledged market for energy efficiency. This would combine various technologies and energy services
(e.g. whole retrofit packages39) and involve many market players to help obliged parties handle very
ambitious energy efficiency policy. Vertical arrangements like long‐term contracts or joint ventures
sustain that process as long as actors progress towards higher marginal costs savings. When a new
potential is tapped, technological and organisational learning is triggered and lowers technology
costs. Likewise, besides diffusion, growing emphasis is placed on the innovation process. National

38

<www.certinergy.com> (webpage visited April 2010)

39

There is early evidence of such commercial products, for example the “Optireno” offer promoted jointly by
Banque Populaire (bank), Isover (insulation products) and GDZ SUEZ as main partners. See <www.optireno.fr>
(website visited April 2010).
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institutions, white certificates schemes designs and policy portfolios must be adapted to accompany
this evolution, in order to preserve the “consistency principle”.
It is therefore fundamental to have a dynamic view of white certificates schemes and we propose
hereafter the prospect of a four step deployment of white certificates schemes, alongside the
implicit marginal cost curve of energy efficiency potentials (as roughly depicted on Figure 2).
Transitions to subsequent potentials are conditional to changes in regulation, like energy savings
target settlement and cost recovery permissions. Although schemes have drawn country‐specific
outcomes in their early stages, we foresee an ideal but slow convergence towards a unified market
for energy efficiency.

Step 1: Technology and flexibility experimentation
At the implementation step, obliged parties focus on their core business with traditional partners
(equipment producers, retailers and installers). They do not compete head‐on because they operate
on separate markets (e.g. efficient electric heaters for an electricity supplier versus condensing
boilers for a gas supplier) and concentrate on their captive customers, so that there is no real
competition among them on the downstream side. However, they also tap low cost potentials (e.g.
lighting) and might experiment a wide range of technological fields to reveal their costs and develop
new skills. They initiate vertical relationships with related businesses. Under this first stage, energy
savings come at low cost and strategic intertemporal banking can be important to anticipate further
difficulties in tapping costlier potentials.

Step 2: Low hanging fruit picking
Obliged parties harvest the low cost potentials that they have identified previously. They subcontract
or partner with related business to reinforce vertical arrangements aimed at minimizing overall
compliance cost. On the consumer side, they enhance their commercial offers with services like
information, diagnosis, etc. In countries where costs can be recovered, they start granting important
subsidies. Where costs cannot be recovered, major suppliers focus on information services and
upstream business structurizing. This is made possible by the presence of complementary
instruments (e.g. tax credit) that support consumer investments. Low cost potential being still
abundant, banking remains important.

Step 3: Activity upscale
As low hanging fruit potentials start being exhausted, more labour and organisational demanding
measures become necessary. Vertical arrangements linking obliged parties and related businesses
become fully operational to extend skills, to investigate markets more remote from the core business
(like insulation) and to capture new market shares. Cost heterogeneity might arise among vertical
arrangements but to such a low extent that they are still reluctant to trade. Energy savings provisions
that were carried over start being used for compliance and the banking of new savings declines. On
the consumer side, information is not sufficient anymore to incentivise customers. To reach this
maturity step, cost recovery must be allowed consistently to ease the systematic use of financial
rebates.
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Step 4: Energy efficiency unified market
In that ultimate step, a unified and competitive market for energy efficiency emerges, supplied by a
few integrated vertical clusters. They are able to provide whole retrofit packages merging different
skills and technologies, like insulation, lighting, heating system, etc. Consumers benefit from large
subsidies for retrofits but pay a higher energy price because as long as targets have scaled up,
obliged parties have been allowed to recover the burden through energy tariff. The process of
vertical organization is now fully mature. Cost heterogeneity among clusters competing on one single
market arises and horizontal trade between clusters allows for equalizing marginal costs. Promoting
innovation is another way to differentiate. Intertemporal banking is over.

The rate of that evolutionary process will be primarily influenced by the increase of the energy
savings target (Peerels, 2008). The eligibility of non‐obliged actors might also attract new players and
increase the competition to acquire property rights on energy savings, thus speeding‐up that overall
dynamics. The penalty for non‐compliance might be another driver of that process, since the higher
the pre‐set penalty, the more profitable it is to investigate high cost potentials for target fulfilment.
In this prospect, we guess that France and Italy stand currently in step 2 and the longest running
British scheme (in its current CERT version) stands at step 3. In Great‐Britain, the Government has
announced maintaining the energy suppliers obligation until 2020 at least and market provisions are
being enhanced to serve that purpose (Defra, 2007). In Italy, targets have been prolonged and
increased from 4.4 Mtoe over the 2008‐09 period to 21 Mtoe over the 2008‐2012 period (Pavan,
2008). In France, the scheme is about to be extended to gasoline retailers, with an overall target
scaled up to 100 TWh/year40 (against 18 TWh/year from 2006 to 2009). The dynamic framework
proposed above helps assess some of the evolutions foreseen for white certificates schemes.
Regarding the extension of the obligation to gasoline retailers, an issue addressed by Rezessy et al.
(2009), we expect transfers from the transport sector to the building sector. Actually, the potential
for savings is less profound than in the residential building sector, and relationships with final
customers are much more remote, so that gasoline retailers will have fewer direct means to comply
with their target. As a result, they will either pay the penalty or purchase cheaper certificates
produced in the residential sector, which will undoubtedly raise acceptability concerns. Regarding
the creation of a EU‐wide system, an issue addressed from the early implementation of white
certificates schemes onwards (Farinelli et al., 2005; Mundaca, 2008), it has been underlined by many
observers that country‐specific issues are currently overwhelming and preclude any design
convergence. We consider that any country intending to participate should at least have reached
step 4 to join any international scheme. Moreover, national energy security objectives can be
contradictory among countries (Pointvogl, 2009) and concur to limit the advantages of an EU‐wide
scheme.

40

Ministry of Sustainable Development, press communiqué, 26 may 2009
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7. Conclusion
On the methodological point of view, we provided and partially validated a stylized representation of
white certificates schemes. From a review of theoretical works, we depicted white certificates
schemes as a constrained subsidy on energy efficient goods coupled with a compensatory end‐use
energy tax, whereby transfers between obliged parties and related business prevail. The
confrontation of these findings to practical outcomes required two preliminary tasks. Firstly, to make
explicit the influence of the national regulatory context on the design of the instrument on the one
hand, the influence of the design on the performance on the other hand. Secondly, to perform a
comprehensive analysis of costs which are only partially disclosed. This resulted in a twofold
representation of white certificates schemes. On the upstream side, they induce powerful vertical
process to create a whole market for energy efficiency embodying costly potentials. On the
consumer side, they act as a subsidy for energy efficient goods where the burden can be recovered,
and more simply as an information tool otherwise. With this respect, the hybrid subsidy‐ tax
mechanism is valid but conditional to energy price setting rules and following cost recovery liberties.
As well, the pre‐eminence of vertical transfers is valid but holding for current steps only. A fruitful
area for future research could be to better represent the trade‐off between vertical and horizontal
organisation.
By supplementing this static analysis by a dynamic efficiency evaluation, we back the view that white
certificates, or broadly defined energy savings obligations and credits, can draw positive social
outcomes by accurately tapping scattered potentials for energy conservation in the context of
European liberalized energy markets. The use of multiple evaluation criteria, as performed differently
by Mundaca and Neij (2009) is crucial to fairly judge schemes outcomes. For instance, the British
experience shows the highest level of static efficiency but a lower level of dynamic efficiency than
the French one. But altogether, white certificates experiences appear to be cost‐effective and carry
out net social benefits wherever they are implemented. Marked discrepancies among countries arise
in early steps but should probably be narrowed as schemes scale up. More importantly, white
certificates schemes show good “dynamic” properties. In particular, they prompt obliged parties to
transform the markets for energy equipments and services and to federate related energy service
businesses around them through vertical arrangements. In frequent situations where the burden
cannot be immediately passed through on energy price, capturing new market shares and
investigating new technological fields is the only way for obliged companies to take advantage of the
scheme. This is part of the explanation for the absence of horizontal trade, i.e. white certificates
exchange among obliged parties. Albeit a commodity, the “white certificate” is not homogeneous but
split among numerous markets, involving different technologies and skills. Deemed savings are a
physical abstraction that guarantees energy performance and provides fungibility among separate
markets. But it is not sufficient to create a homogeneous good providing a fully‐fledged “energy
efficiency” service, merging different technologies. The main process at stake in white certificates
scheme is therefore to build vertical relationships aimed at supplying such a unified market. That
impetus is triggered by the “obligation” component rather than the “market” component. At
subsequent steps, when appropriate vertical clusters will be consolidated, we could expect market
provisions to become important and enhance the efficiency of the scheme. Lastly, it is worth
mentioning that white certificates schemes serve that purpose within a policy mix including
30
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information programs, building codes and even tax credits. Owing to their performance rather than
technology focus, white certificates are likely to be the main driver of the mix though.
Lastly, distributive effects and policy interaction deserve more attention for both theoretical and
empirical works in the future. Whereas only a few people might benefit from the scheme, the cost
can be passed through to all consumers. As schemes scale up, the question of beneficiaries is raising
crucial equity concerns. Fischer (2005) underlines that this issue is linked to the structure of the
markets for energy efficiency technologies. Similarly, we saw briefly that policy interaction is a crucial
issue in terms of efficiency and beforehand, in terms of justification.

31

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

31

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 520 [2010]

Annex: Normalized energy savings, costs and benefits
calculation details
We detail hereafter the calculations made for Table 1 (third row) an Table 4. We strove for
expressing each target in the same normalized unit as for the French scheme: TWh of end‐use
energy, cumulated over the average lifetime of the measures and discounted at 4%. Please note that
we solely considered energy savings realised against the target and did not count overachievements
for the estimation of costs and benefits.

France
Cost estimates
We have carried out an inductive estimation of the costs of the three main obliged agents, namely
EDF, GDF Suez and Ecofioul (professional association representing fuel oil retailers), based on ADEME
data. We have conducted a systematic review and quantification of the relevant sources of costs
borne by the three companies and other bodies under consideration. As outlined in Table A1, we
distinguished fixed and variable parts within indirect costs. Fixed costs are sunk costs paid to develop
news activities in response to the white certificates obligation. This covers material investments like
information networks and immaterial investments in energy efficiency training. Variable costs are
indirect costs related to the volume of energy efficiency measures, like phone centers and marketing.
A basic rule of thumb has been used to derive values for the national objective of 54 TWh from the
results related to the three main obliged parties, whose obligation covered 48 TWh cumac.
Direct costs
•
•
•
•
•

Advice
Diagnosis
Subsidies
Soft loans
Energy services

•
•
•
•
•

Indirect costs
Variable
Call centers for delivering
•
energy advice
•
Technical advice
Professional partnership
•
Marketing
Administration of the
scheme

Fixed
Training
Commercial offer
development
Information networks

Table A1: Relevant sources of costs borne by obliged parties in France
Costs borne by consumers are the full investment cost for measures like insulation but the cost
differential with the standard technology for boilers and appliances, net from tax credits and obliged
parties subsidies. It has been calculated using the measures repartition provided by DGEC (2009) and
the average measure price from ADEME database. The Government is assumed to be the only “other
party” bearing costs, as tax credits granted to consumers and tax deductions granted to fuel oil
suppliers who join professional associations. Those amount to 966 and 25 M€ respectively, thus
991M€ altogether. Tax credits to customers represent on the average 26% of the investment cost.
Obliged parties direct costs (M€)

66

Obliged parties indirect costs (M€)

119

Customer costs (M€)

814
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Other parties costs (M€)

991

TOTAL COSTS (M€)

1990

Table A2: Costs of the main contributors in France
Note that free riding and rebound effects should be considered against costs. Although part of them
is supposed to be accounted for in deemed savings calculation, a residual part might hamper cost‐
effectiveness41. Unlike the British evaluator, we were not able to perform an in‐depth analysis of
these elements for France.

Monetary savings from reduced energy bill
Monetary benefits from reduced energy bill are calculated using a constant average energy price of
0.08 €/kWh (including VAT). Note that as the energy savings are discounted, thus so are the
monetary savings. We find that the scheme yielded 4,320 M€ of monetary savings.

Monetary savings from reduced CO2 emissions
We build the monetary value of carbon savings upon both carbon dioxide savings estimates and the
social value of carbon. The amount of CO2 emissions saved is not straightforward to estimate in
France. First, the fuel breakdown of energy savings is not provided by the regulator and from the
main measures implemented we deducted fuel shares of 23% for electricity, 56% for gas and 21% for
fuel oil. Second, the French electricity generation mix is highly dominated by nuclear power for base
load and peak load is mainly supplied by fossil fuels. Therefore, estimates of carbon savings from
reduced electricity consumption might differ whether one considers the average or marginal carbon
content of electricity. For the dominant heating measures, the average value is 180 gCO2/kWh
(ADEME and EDF, 2005) and the marginal value is 550 gCO2/kWh (ADEME and RTE, 2007). We use
these values for low and high estimates, plus a central one set at 365 gCO2/kWh. Carbon contents of
natural gas and fuel oil are assumed to be 206 and 271 gCO2/kWh, respectively (ADEME, 2008). Note
that the CO2 savings are related to undiscounted energy savings, since CO2 is assumed to be removed
definitively from the atmosphere once saved.
Social benefits accruing from reduced CO2 emissions are valuated in monetary terms using the social
value of carbon proposed for the French economy (Quinet et al., 2008). It is set at 32€/tCO2 in 2010,
56€/tCO2 in 2020 and 100€/tCO2 in 2030. From DGEC data we estimated the average measures
lifetime to be 20 years, energy savings thus lasting from 2006 to 2028. We use 46€/tCO2 as an
approximation of the carbon value in the intermediate year 2016.

CO2 savings from electricity (MtCO2)

Low value

Central value

High value

3.2

4.6

9.8

41

According to the stylized representation outlined in Section 2, Giraudet and Quirion (2008) show that the
“tax” component is likely to induce “sufficiency” behavior, and thus bound the rebound effect to 10% of energy
efficiency losses compared to effective energy savings. In the real world, due to very low price‐elasticity of
residential energy consumption, this behavioural response might be limited and the rebound effect higher.
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CO2 savings from natural gas (MtCO2)

8.7

8.7

8.7

CO2 savings from fuel oil (MtCO2)

4.4

4.4

4.4

TOTAL SAVINGS (MtCO2)

16.3

17.7

22.9

Monetary savings (M€)

751

815

1054

Table A3: CO2 savings in France

GreatBritain
We build primarily on the values provided by Lees (2008) for the evaluation of the EEC2 scheme. We
generally use a 1.4 €/£ exchange rate, which is a good guess of the average market exchange rate
over the April 2005‐March 2008 period, according to monthly records of OANDA
(<http://www.oanda.com/>, website visited March 2010).

Normalized energy savings
The quantitative obligation of the EEC2 period was 130 TWh of cumulated energy savings fuel
standardized, discounted at 3.5%. When converted in their original fuel units, discounted at 4%,
those savings amount to 45.9 TWh for electricity, 134.9TWh for gas and 11.6TWh for other fossil
fuels, thus altogether 192 TWh (Lees, personal communication). This means 64 TWh/year for the
three years of EEC2.
Although labelled in MtCO2 saved, the CERT target is twice the EEC2 target, therefore 384TWh or
128TWh/year over 2008‐2011.

Cost estimates
Direct costs have been calculated by Lees using estimates from the policy regulator (Defra) and the
share paid by each agent is derived from information reported to the administrator (Ofgem) by
obliged suppliers. Indirect costs are considered as the sum of “administrative costs” and “transaction
costs”. The latter have been estimated under EEC1 as shares of investment costs dedicated to tasks
like persuading consumers and negotiating with third parties. They have reached 8‐12% and 24‐32%
of total investment cost for lighting and insulation measures, respectively (Mundaca, 2007). Overall,
indirect costs are estimated by Lees on a deductive manner as 18% of the obliged parties direct costs
under EEC2.
Other notable parties bearing costs are social housing providers and managing agents. Note that the
costs borne by customers are the resulting part of the investment cost (full cost for insulation, cost
differential with the market standard for heating systems and appliances).
Lees estimates (M£)

Corrected estimates (M€)

Obliged parties direct costs

775

1085

Obliged parties indirect costs

140

195

Customer costs

232

325
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Other parties costs

109

TOTAL COSTS

1256

153

Table A4: Relevant sources of costs borne by obliged parties in Great‐Britain (Source: Lees, 2008)

Monetary savings from reduced energy bill
Interestingly, free‐riding and rebound effects are accounted for by the British evaluator thanks to a
“deadweight” factor of 20% and a “comfort increase” factor of 15%. Nevertheless, we use the values
including both deadweight and the value of comfort (including VAT) to keep the comparison to other
schemes consistent (Lees, 2008, Table A5.3).
M£

M€

Present value to electricity consumers

4,800

6,720

Present value to gas consumers

4,030

5,642

Present value to fuel consumers

470

658

9,300

13,020

TOTAL

Table A5: Present value of the energy savings (Source: Lees, 2008; 1£=1.4€)

Monetary savings from reduced CO2 emissions
We build the monetary value of carbon savings upon both carbon dioxide savings estimates and the
social value of carbon. We first use Lees’ estimation of lifetime carbon dioxide savings to target of
72.6 MtCO2, including deadweight (Lees, 2008, Table A5.6). Then we use the last available social
value of carbon recommended by DECC for the use of carbon values in economic appraisal (DECC,
2010, Table 1). The average measures lifetime has been estimated to be 34 years (Lees, personal
communication). Carbon savings are thus supposed to last from 2005 to 2028, so we take the 2023
social value as an average (given a linear increase of the recommended value). For policies affecting
non‐ETS sectors, DECC provides low, central and high 2016 values of 31, 62 and 93 £/tCO2,
respectively (43, 87 and 130 €/tCO2). Contrary to France, the uncertainty is thus placed on the carbon
price rather than on the carbon savings. As a result, the central estimate of monetary savings arising
from reduced CO2 emissions is 6,302 M€, with low and high values of 2,846 and 8,639 M€,
respectively.

Italy
Our estimation of the Italian scheme is much rougher, due to a lack of cost data. Following partial
results thus are to be interpreted carefully.

Normalized energy savings
One preliminary task is to convert annual savings of primary energy in toe into lifetime end‐use
savings in kWh. First, we use the 2/3 ratio used by Eyre et al. (2009) to convert primary savings into
end‐use savings. Second, since the white certificates are issued over five years, we cumulate the
savings over the same period, discounted at 4%. Note that insulation measures must be cumulated
35
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over eight years, but given the low amount of insulation measures realised so far, we apply the five
years lifetime to all measures. Lastly, the conventional conversion factor from toe to kWh is 11,630.
Electricity

Gas

TOTAL

2005 primary energy target (Mtoe)

0.1

0.1

0.2

2006 primary energy target (Mtoe)

0.2

0.2

0.4

2007 primary energy target (Mtoe)

0.4

0.4

0.8

2008 primary energy target (Mtoe)

1.2

1

2.2

2005‐2008 primary energy target (Mtoe)

1.9

1.7

3.6

2005‐2008 lifetime primary energy target (Mtoe)

8.8

7.9

16.7

2005‐2008 lifetime end‐use energy target (TWh)

68

60

128

Table A6: Energy savings expressed in normalized units over the 2005‐08 period in Italy
Following this methodology, the initial target covering the 2005‐2009 period was 156TWh, thus
31TWh/year. The recent regulatory changes increased and prolonged the target, so that it represents
796 TWh, thus 100TWh/year over the 2005‐2012 period.

Cost estimates
From Pavan (2008) and AEEG (2008), we estimate the average exchange price of white certificates to
be 60€/toe over the 2006‐2008 period. Given the predominance of white certificates exchanges in
the scheme, we consider this price to be a good proxy for the marginal cost of the scheme for obliged
distributors and other market actors (undifferentiated from direct and indirect costs). For the total
amount of energy savings, this yields 1,080 M€ of monetary savings.
Regarding the operating mode that has prevailed up to now in the residential sector, namely the
nearly free distribution of CFLs and water economizers, we simply assume the customer cost to be
zero. Note that the 100€/toe contribution that customer pay for the cost recovery mechanism is
ultimately rebated to obliged distributors. We consider it as a transfer within the scheme and hence
do not count it. Other costs should include, among others, the contribution of public authorities to
the investment cost on measures realised on their premises, like public lighting. Data are not
available to serve that purpose. Therefore, our evaluation of the costs of the Italian scheme is very
likely to be an underestimate.

Monetary savings from reduced energy bill
Pavan (2008) figures out that avoided energy costs for consumers are around 600€/toe for electricity
and 750€/toe for gas. This yields 5,700 and 6,375 M€ of electricity and gas savings, for a total of
amount of 11,181M€.

Monetary savings from reduced CO2 emissions
According to Eyre et al. (2009), 4.5 TWh of annual end‐use savings saves 1.5 MtCO2 in Italy. With a
basic rule of thumb be assume the 128 TWh target to save 42.7 MtCO2. Italy has not set any official
36
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social value of carbon. We thus use the conventional 20€/tCO2 value to estimate monetary savings
accruing from carbon dioxide savings. Those amount to 853M€.
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